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STANDING AND THE PROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION:
REVIVING A TRADITIONAL APPROACH?
I. Introduction
Within the context of particular cases, the federal judiciary has been in-
creasingly willing to address broad social policy issues. This trend has en-
couraged public resort to the courts as a forum for settling grievances arising
from conflicting individual or group rights, rather than to the more traditional
electoral and legislative processes to formulate social policy.' Supporters of this
development point approvingly to the increased opportunity it provides for
direct input by individuals or groups into the democratic process. Yet critics
question the wisdom of this increasingly frequent judicial intrusion into areas of
policy making traditionally reserved to legislatures and other policy-making
bodies.2 The trend of judicial policy-making represents a distinct departure from
the courts' historical respect for the co-equal status of the three branches of
government and for the role the executive and the legislature play in formulating
public policy.
From a more practical point of view, this trend has created great congestion
in the courts, particularly in the United States Supreme Court.' This congestion
has aroused fears of declining quality of federal opinions due to time pressures.
In turn, overcrowded dockets have produced a seeming lack of conformity in
federal law due to the Supreme Court's inability to adequately supervise the
circuits.4 Proposals advanced to counteract these developments range from a
National Court of Appeals,' with intermediate jurisdiction between the circuits
and the Supreme Court, to the abolition of diversity jurisdiction.6
However, none of these suggestions addresses the underlying question of
whether the federal courts should continue to intervene in social policy. Continu-
ation of social engineering by the courts creates a risk of government by injunc-
1 Archibald Cox has articulated the basic public confidence in the Court, stating that:
[M]odern government is simply too large and too remote, and, too few issues are
fought in elections, for a citizen to feel much more sense of participation in the
legislative process than the judicial.
Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitutional Processes, 55
N.C.L. REv. 1, 115 (1976).
2 See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1961); Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37
U. Chi. L. Rev. 47 (1969).
3 In 1951, for example, the number of cases filed in the Court was 1,234. By the 1971
Term, it had tripled to 3,643. More recent figures reveal 3,741 filings for the 1972 Term and
4,186 in the 1973 Term. Griswold, Rationing justice-The Supreme Court's Caseload and
What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 335, 337 (1975). One cause for this
increase is that there are more people and more complex forms of regulation protecting
interests that were less valued earlier, such as civil rights and the environment. Stolz,
Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional
Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 943, 952 (1976).
4 Kurland, supra note 2, at 59.
5 The National Court of Appeals is a proposal growing out of the 1972 Report of the
Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court by the Federal Judicial Center. This
report (commonly referred to as "The Freund Report") was commissioned by Chief Justice
Burger to analyze the workload of the Court and to make recommendations for its re-
distribution. As one such recommendation, the National Court of Appeals would operate on a
national level to screen cases on appeal from the circuits before they are considered by the
Supreme 'Court. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a
Change, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 626 (1974).
6 Griswold, supra note 3, at 337-46.
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tion, which would undermine the integrity of both the electoral process and
legislative compromise as means to resolve social policy disputes. Courts, which
are not as subject to control by the electorate as is the legislature, substitute their
own views of desirable social policies for those which have been formulated by
public debate and legislation.
In contrast to the proposed more radical solutions, the traditional doctrine
of standing comes closest to specifically addressing the problem of improper use
of the courts to air generalized grievances, which may more appropriately be
resolved by another governmental branch. The rules of standing are not only
part of the threshold inquiry into the justiciability of a particular case' but in-
clude as well aspects of the traditional self-restraint exercised by the federal courts
when faced with plaintiffs who raise social policy issues. Often, standing rules
have been used successfully as a screening device to eliminate cases which the
court feels present issues inappropriate for judicial resolution. Such issues may
include disputes concerning legislative funding decisions, administrative action
by an executive agency, alteration of de facto housing patterns by court action,
or the right to receive government benefits.
The initial inquiry concerning standing addresses not only the question of
whether the court should hear the case, but also whether this particular plaintiff
is the party that may most properly raise the constitutional issue or challenge the
agency action. When the plaintiff's standing is in issue, the court must make a
careful inquiry into the his status, the nature of the injury he alleges, and the type
of issues he presents for the court's determination. Broadly stated, a litigant will
have standing to assert a right or enjoin a governmental action if he can show
that the right or the injury is personal or, at the very least, that he has a personal
interest which will be affected by the outcome of the litigation.
Since many individuals raising social policy issues in the federal courts have
only a "public welfare" interest in the determination of these issues, the standing
requirement offers a convenient device to aid a court in avoiding judicial resolu-
tion of essentially non-judicial matters of social policy formulation. Such "ideo-
logical"" plaintiffs were granted standing most frequently during the Warren
Court's activist years. The resulting proliferation of public actions and the
broadening judicial incursions into policy-making has revived fears of judicial
usurpation of the legislature's role as a policy-maker in a democratic society.'
Inappropriate judicial policy decisions not only raise serious separation of powers
questions. From a practical standpoint, they disproportionately divert the court's
attention and energy from pressing criminal, anti-trust or other private civil
litigation to cases raising social policy issues.
7 Standing is thus an issue which must be determined before a court will permit the
plaintiff to proceed to the merits of his case. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975).
8 The source of this term appears to be the distinction drawn by the legal philosopher
Hohfeld who distinguished this group from the usual plaintiff who invokes the court process to
vindicate or enforce a right or a power he personally holds. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 1033.
9 Justice Moore, criticizing the interference of the majority in public policy by upholding
one competing social value (housing) over another (use of land for a wild life preserve)
feared the "establishment of a principle that the judgment and discretion exercised by the
executive and legislative of government can be examined .. . (or even overturned) by any
citizen, aided by the judiciary ... " Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 583 (2d Cir. 1975) (Moore,
J., dissenting).
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Partly in reaction to this increasing intervention, the Supreme Court has
recently scrutinized carefully the standing of the plaintiff bringing the action,
and has imposed a more stringent application of standing requirements than that
of its predecessor. Certainly, holding a plaintiff as the improper party to raise the
issue, and denying access to the courts to litigate the matter on that basis, is one
effective method of limiting court influence on public policy.
However, questions remain concerning the feasibility of further narrowing
the standing doctrine as a means to control judicial policy-making. To address
these questions, one must undertake an examination of both the current status of
the doctrine, in the context of its historical background, and the policy considera-
tions underlying standing. Some predictions concerning future developments
may be made based upon this analysis. Finally, the wisdom and effectiveness of
a stricter standing doctrine must be measured against its probable impact upon
the public plaintiff seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.
II. Standing: Its Expansion from Frothingham to Flast
A. Standing and the Public Action
Standing issues frequently arise in the context of public actions.' Private
individuals may sue on their own and on the public's behalf as "private attorney
generals,"" challenging the acts of an executive agency alleged to be outside the
scope of its legal authority. Moreover, citizens may sue to challenge the constitu-
tionality of a federal or state law. Both types of public actions may raise a jus
tertii2 standing problem since the nature of the action requires these citizen-
plaintiffs to assert the rights of third persons not parties to the suit when alleging
injury.
Traditionally, federal courts focus on two separate aspects when considering
standing issues. First, standing is an aspect of the Article III "case or contro-
versy" requirement and, thus, derives in part from the Constitution. 3 Secondly,
standing is an administrative rule formulated by the court to prevent undue
judicial intervention in decisions by other governmental branches. 4
To establish the existence of an Article III case or controversy, a public
plaintiff must allege an injury to himself, or at least a personal stake in the
action's outcome. In Baker v. Carr"5 the Supreme Court emphasized that this
requirement will guarantee sharpened issues necessary for an adversarial proceed-
ing. The adverseness of self-interested parties insures that the issues will be
framed with sufficient specificity and pursued with the requisite vigor to establish
an Article III case or controversy. A court, when faced with carefully framed
10 They also arise in disputes between private litigants when the defendant alleges that
the plaintiff's injury is not a right or privilege recognized by law. See Hardin v. Kentucky
Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
11 First mentioned in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1941),
this term refers to a private plaintiff attempting to enforce the limitations Congress has placed
on an agency or other institution. Accord, Data Processors Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 149
(1970).
12 Literally, the right of a third party. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1001 (4th ed. 1951).
13 422 U.S. at 500.
14 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1939) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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issues, supported by specific facts, may then fashion .a remedy appropriate only
to the particular dispute before it, and avoid overly broad solutions to some real
or imagined social evil.
This insistence upon the Article III requirement has defeated public actions
in the past. For example, in Frothingham v. Mellan,"6 the Court dismissed a
taxpayer suit challenging the constitutionality of Congress' appropriation of
funds to administer a maternal health program in the states. To meet the standing
test, the Court required the taxpayer to allege not only the invalidity of the
statute, but also a direct injury, or the threat of a direct injury, to himself. The
mere fact that his increased tax burden causes him to suffer "in some way with
people generally" was an injury insufficient to meet the standing requirement of a
particularized injury.17
To meet this requirement, a plaintiff must specifically establish the harm
done to his personal interests by a private or governmental action. A vague
allegation of some general injury to these same interests is insufficient. For ex-
ample, in an action challenging a municipality's refusal to issue a building permit
for a low-cost housing project, a plaintiff may allege that as a result of this
refusal he has been unable to locate housing suitable to his needs and income,
and incurred greater expense and inconvenience when forced to obtain housing
elsewhere. By contrast, a plaintiff who only alleges that a community's general
opposition to low-cost housing has deprived him of the opportunity to live in
the area, without additional allegations of personal economic or other harm,
suffers in no more particular way than others whose income limits their available
housing choices. This type of general harm to a member of an identifiable social
group is the result of fundamental social attitudes better altered by public opinion
and legislative action than court-ordered social engineering. The former situation
presents not only an on-going pattern of discrimination but also a specific
instance of individual harm. It may be appropriately redressed by court action
in the form of an award of damages, an invalidation of a discriminatory zoning
ordinance, or reversal of a zoning decision.
The basic standing tests formulated by Frothingham evidence two major
concerns. First is the Court's concern that by sanctioning taxpayer suits a flood
of litigation would ensue.1 More significant is the Court's fear that permitting
such suits, without the prerequisite of a direct injury to the complaining taxpayer
as a result of Congress' appropriation, would create unwarranted judicial
restraint on a separate, equal branch of the government.
The Frothingham standing rule has served for nearly forty years as an
absolute bar to taxpayer suits. Its "direct injury" test was also applied in other
types of public suits, and generally defeated the plaintiff's standing claim. 9
16 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
17 Id. at 488.
18 Id. at 487.
19 The "direct injury" test of Frothingham has stubbornly survived the more liberal con-
structions of the degree of interest an individual litigant must have in a public action.
Although the Warren Court found an allegation of an "injury in fact" sufficient for a case-or-
controversy, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), the Burger Court by its decision in
Warth has revitalized a form of the direct injury test. The plaintiff must now allege that he has
personally suffered injury due to the defendant's acts. In part this stricter approach is due to
the present Court's more conservative view on the wisdom of judicial policy making.
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However, the Warren Court radically departed from the Frothingham rule by
formulating the more liberal "nexus" test to be applied in taxpayer suits. First
articulated in Flast v. Cohen,"0 the Court focused on status, rather than injury.
Flast involved a taxpayer suit challenging the constitutionality of Congress'
appropriation of funds to provide textbooks for religious schools. Concluding
that an emphasis on the nature of the plaintiff's injury was improper to resolve a
standing controversy because it addressed the merits of the action, the Court
held that a determination of the plaintiff's standing depends upon the nature of
the plaintiff himself.
When standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person
whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication
of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable. 21
Thus, a new test for standing was fashioned under Flast: the plaintiff must
show a nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the specific constitutional
prohibition involved." If the taxpayer can demonstrate this nexus, then he has
alleged a sufficient "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" to sharpen
the issues into the necessary adverseness." However, the court may still decline to
hear the case on the merits upon grounds unrelated to standing. 4
The most noteworthy aspect of Flast is its conclusion that standing is not a
purely constitutional requirement. 5 Of course the basis of the standing require-
ment is rooted in the Article III limitation that the federal courts decide issues
only in the context of an actual case or controversy." However, the language does
not define the precise nature of a case or controversy. The rules of standing
represent the judicial response to this imprecision and constitute part of the
threshold inquiry into a case. Therefore, establishment of a personal stake by
the plaintiff is a court-imposed condition to the existence of a case or controversy.
Indeed, even if the plaintiff satisfies this condition, the court may still rule that its
historical reticence in treating many social issues warrants dismissal of the case.
Standing, thus, includes the additional component of judicial discretion.
The Flast Court, therefore, defined standing as a blend of Article III limita-
tions, and a policy of judicial self-governance, which prevent courts from in-
truding into areas reserved to other branches of government. According to the
20 392 U.S. 83 (1962).
21 Id. at 99-100.
22 The taxpayer-plaintiffs in Flast were challenging the congressional appropriation of
funds to provide textbooks for religious schools on the grounds that it violated the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
492 U.S. at 86.
23 392 U.S. at 102. The Flast opinion left very unclear, however, the degree of nexus
necessary to establish a personal stake. In subsequent opinions the nexus was established by as
little as the imposition of a $1.50 poll tax (Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966)), or a $5.00 fine plus costs (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
The basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough
for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing
and the principle supplies the motivation.
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers & Others, 35 U. Cil. L. REV. 601, 613 (1972).
24 For example, a court may dismiss a case because it presents a political question or a
moot issue.
25 The decision in Frothingham did not specifically address the issue of whether standing
was a constitutional requirement. Until the decision in Flast, this question had remained
unresolved.
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9, cI. 2.
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Court, standing is an aspect of justiciability which is "not a legal concept with a
fixed meaning susceptible of scientific definition. Its utilization is the resultant of
many subtle pressures."2 7
Resolution of a standing question after Flast becomes a delicate balancing
test between the Court's desire to consider an important social issue and its
respect for the role of other government branches in influencing the decision to
be reached. The predominant attitude concerning judicial policy-making among
the Court's members often may tip the balance in favor of one of these two
considerations."
The need for judicial self-restraint assumes greater importance when federal
courts are faced with the possible invalidation of actions of Congress, federal
agencies or state legislatures. Judicial hesitancy at undue interference with
actions of the legislature or the executive branch and its agencies particularly
exists in cases where the relevant statute does not expressly grant standing. 9
For example, an individual is not expressly authorized by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 to challenge an IRS grant of tax-exempt status to a charitable in-
stitution by disputing its fulfillment of the statutory "charitable purpose" re-
quirement. Thus, the aggrieved plaintiff must attempt to challenge the ex-
ecutive agency's action by invoking § 10, the general standing provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).S° Further problems arise in those situa-
tions when the plaintiff attempts to challenge as unconstitutional the operation of
the statute upon him.
Initially, the Supreme Court approached these problems by liberally con-
struing the pertinent language of § 10 of the APA. The Court found a con-
gressional intent to grant standing to persons adversely affected by an agency
action. However, it limited this construction by developing a twofold test in the
companion cases of Data Processors Service v. Camp and Barlow v. Collins.1
27 392 U.S. at 100.
28 For example, Justice Douglas has frequently urged the Court not to hesitate to reach
great issues. His activist philosophy envisions the Court as an aggressive overseer of Congress
and the Executive whose actions may threaten individual rights. 392 U.S. at, 109-12 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
29 It is also mentioned in those cases where Congress has specifically granted standing by
statute to the "public" to challenge the legitimacy of an agency action under the authority of
that statute. In such instances, courts have carefully examined the legislative intent of the
express grant of standing to determine how broad a category of plaintiffs was envisioned. See
Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1941); Local
194, Retail v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1976).
30 Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) (hereinafter
cited as the APA), states: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action or is
adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial
review thereof." For cases construing this provision, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976); Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 424
F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31 397 U.S. 159 (1970). These tests are developed more fully in Data Processing. There,
the Court found that the plaintiff's allegation of economic harm created by the competition of
national banks in providing data processing services was a sufficient claim of "injury in fact."
The question remained as to whether the economic interest was also within the zone of interests
protected by the Bank Service Corporation Act. The Act's purpose, according to the Court, was
essentially to prevent bank involvement in non-bank activity. Any interest, such as the
plaintiff's, which fairly fell within the public interest in limiting the dominance of large
financial institutions in non-banking activities.
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32 Id. at 154.
First, the plaintiff must allege an injury in fact, in order to concretely establish
the issues and satisfy the case or controversy requirement. Secondly, the court
must consider whether the specific interest to which the plaintiff alleges injury is
within "zone of interests" protected by the particular statute. The zone of in-
terests can be quite broad; it may include "aesthetic, conservational, and recre-
ational as well as economic values," within the scope of a single statute.3 2 If the
plaintiff's interest arguably falls within this zone of interests, then the Court will
permit him to pursue the substantive elements of his attack upon the particular
agency action.
Since the zone of interests is a non-constitutional test applied by judicial
discretion in appropriate cases, 3 it has been used both to recognize and deny the
public plaintiff's standing claim. Depending upon a court's attitude towards
judicial intervention to achieve a particular social result, a narrow or broad
delineation of the relevant zone of interest can provide a receptive court an op-
portunity for social engineering. Primarily, definition of the appropriate zone of
interests depends on the court's view of the magnitude of the issues involved,
the injury alleged, and the wisdom of judicial intervention."4 It may further
depend upon whether the plaintiff also asserts injury to the interest of third
persons who are not parties to the action. If the court permits the plaintiff to
assert jus tertii, it must also inquire whether these third parties' interests also fall
within the zone protected by the relevant statute.
B. Assertion of Third-Party Rights
Frequently plaintiffs who challenge a statute's validity will argue that its
application injures the constitutional or legislatively protected rights of third
persons not joined as plaintiffs in the action. Generally, these ideological
plaintiffs 5 have been denied standing. This denial is based upon a judicial
belief that the assertion of rights not personal to the plaintiff prevents the framing
of issues with sufficient adverseness. Thus, from the threshold of his case the
plaintiff fails to establish the personal stake needed for an Article III case or
controversy.
Exceptions to this broad rule, however, have developed in the area of public
actions. The Court has isolated four relevant factors by examining the factual
situations underlying the assertion of third-party rights. If these factors are
present in a particular case, the plaintiff will be permitted to raise third-party
rights.
A court must first examine the interest of the plaintiff in the outcome of the
33 96 S. Ct. at 1925 n. 19.
34 The zone of interests test as applied to the facts in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159,
actually overrode the broad authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations
under the Tenant Farmers Act. In a challenge by tenant farmers to a U.S. Department of
Agriculture regulation permitting the assignment of cash subsidies to landlords, the Court found
that other purposive language in the Act created a broad zone of interests. It thus imposed a
special duty upon the Secretary of Agriculture to "provide adequate safeguards . . . for the
benefit of tenants." The tenant need show only the lack or loss of benefits by the agency's action
to fall within the protected zone of interests. Id. at 164-65.
35 See note 8, supra.
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controversy. Usually some personal stake is necessary, such as a potential liability
for damages" or a risk of criminal prosecution, unless the challenged state or
federal action is invalidated. Secondly, a court considers the nature of the right
asserted. Generally, the more fundamental the third-party right asserted, the
more likely it is that the court will rule that the plaintiff has standing. For ex-
ample, in Singleton v. Wulff, a group of Missouri doctors alleged that the
Missouri statute denying Medicaid payments to indigent women seeking non-
medically indicated abortions abridged the rights of these women. Although the
doctors themselves did not risk personal liability under the statute, the Court
permitted them to assert their patients' rights.
The third factor to be considered is the relationship between the plaintiff
and the third party. It appears that an ongoing relationship involving some
substantial or intimate association with the persons whose rights are being
asserted is required. This can include organizations asserting members' rights,
doctors asserting rights of patients, or even individual public advocates of the
rights of the third parties involved."
A last consideration is the practicality or possibility for the third to assert his
own rights. An example of such impracticality or impossibility involves chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of anti-birth control statutes which criminalize the
distribution, but not the use of, contraceptive devices. 9 These statutes allegedly
interfere with a woman's privacy rights by limiting her access to such informa-
tion. However, the holder of these infringed rights has no opportunity to chal-
lenge the statute's constitutionality, for a mere user of contraceptives is not liable
for prosecution under the statute. Only the person who makes the contraceptives
available is in a position to raise as part of his own defense the issue of these
third-party privacy rights.
Despite the wide range of cases in which third party rights are asserted,
the Supreme Court has required that all four factors must be present in order to
meet the standing requirement." It is clear, however, that particular emphasis
is placed upon the first factor mentioned, namely, the presence of some allega-
tion of a personal stake however attenuated. This attitude reflects the lingering
judicial suspicion of actions brought by plaintiffs to vindicate the rights of absent
third parties. The personal stake requirement at least insures a measure of
36 In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), where the plaintiff was allowed to assert
the discriminatory effect of a racially restrictive covenant on future black purchasers of her
property, the plaintiff was threatened with. liability for damages for breaching the contract.
37 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976).
38 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (privacy rights of women seeking abortions);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (privacy of couples attempting to obtain birth-control
information); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association rights of
members asserted by organization); Local 194, Retail v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864(7th Cir. 1976) (union asserting its members civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1984
(1970)).
39 This type of statute was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972). The defendant, an advocate of increasing the availability of contraceptive
information, was prosecuted under a Massachusetts statute forbidding distribution of such in-
formation by anyone other than a licensed physician or pharmacist. As part of his defense,
he raised the issue of the interference of an individual's privacy rights by the operation of the
statute.
40 Justice Powell, dissenting in Singleton, particularly notes that only the joint presence of
these factors outweighs the policies behind the general disapproval of jus tertii actions. 96 S.
Ct. at 2877 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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selfish interest on the plaintiff's part even in the most altruistic of actions. It
guarantees that the plaintiff will pursue the action with the vigor essential to
sharpen issues into an Article III case or controversy.
III. The Burger Court: A Stricter Standing Doctrine?
Despite the liberalization of standing tests in modern decisions, the Supreme
Court has remained conscious of the role standing has played in limiting judicial
consideration of certain social policy issues. The judicial activist philosophy of
the Warren Court frequently minimized the dangers of too much Court-inter-
ference in public policy. But the present Court appears to be carefully scrutiniz-
ing each plaintiff's status in cases presenting a standing issue. With certain
notable exceptions, recent decisions have adopted a stricter approach to standing
questions. This attitude is especially prevalent when the Court fears that a
decision on the issues raised by the plaintiff would constitute an undue intrusion
upon the policy-making province of other governmental branches.
In Warth v. Seldin,4 ' a sharply divided Court refused to grant standing to a
group of minority plaintiffs who claimed that the zoning ordinances of the
defendant-town prevented them from finding suitable housing within their
means. The majority opinion emphasized that standing, in addition to determin-
ing whether a case or controversy exists, also operates as a rule of judicial self-
restraint. Standing may take into account the respect which the supreme judicial
body has for the role of other governmental branches in resolving policy con-
troversies. The Warth Court noted:
The rules of standing, whether as aspects of the Article III case-or-con-
troversy requirement or as reflections of prudential considerations defining
and limiting the role of the courts are threshold determinants of the
propriety of judicial intervention. 2
According to this view, the factors affecting the question of propriety depend
primarily upon the plaintiff's allegation that his important personal stake in the
dispute warrants his invocation of the court's jurisdiction. The plaintiff must
show a "demonstrable, particularized injury" to himself, even though he "may
represent a class which has been generally injured by the defendant's action.4
Failure to allege a personal injury, in addition to an injury to third persons, will
warrant dismissal of the action for lack of standing."
In contrast to the Flast status test enunciated earlier by the Supreme Court,
the Court today appears more willing to inquire into the injury alleged, despite
the fact that this implies some examination of the merits at a preliminary stage
41 422 U.S. 490.
42 Id. at 518.
43 Id. at 508. The plaintiffs in Warth brought their action under Congress' broad grant of
standing in the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
44 However, even if the plaintiff alleges some personal injury, the Court may still dismiss
the action for lack of standing by invoking the rule of judicial restraint. Ruling that one of the
organizational plaintiffs did not have standing, the Court conceded nonetheless that it had
alleged the injury of its members who were deprived of the benefits of living in an interracial
community. Nevertheless, the Court felt that "prudential counseling" strongly advised against
granting the plaintiffs' claim of standing. Id. at 514.
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in the case. Nevertheless, a requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate a par-
ticularized injury to himself does guarantee that he will present his cause
vigorously to obtain the requested relief. In response, the court can fashion an ap-
propriate legal remedy whose scope is limited to repairing actual harm done to
this individual. The standing tests adopted by the present Court establish more
fully the existence of the requisite case or controversy than the mere examination
of a plaintiff's status. Furthermore, the Warth injury test more effectively
reduces the risk of congestion in a court's docket by eliminating those plaintiffs
whose injury is either unspecific or results from an otherwise legitimate policy
decision by another governmental branch.
Somewhat limited exceptions to the strict standing tests recently enunciated
by the Supreme Court appear in the line of privacy cases challenging state anti-
contraception and abortion statutes. These cases still require the plaintiff to
allege some injury to himself as well as injury to the privacy rights of the affected
women. However, the Court appears somewhat more lenient concerning the
type of allegations of personal injury to the plaintiff which may be sufficient. In
Singleton v. Wulff45 the plaintiff doctors alleged that the Missouri statute forbid-
ding Medicaid payments to indigent women for non-medically indicated abor-
tions caused economic harm to their practices. The Court found this a sufficient
allegation of a personal stake to establish the doctors' standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the state law on their patients' behalf.
Yet, in Singleton, no apparent bar existed to the patients' own assertion of
their right to abortions. Although this fact has been found dispositive in other jus
tertii actions, it appears that the sensitivity of the issues involved in Si'ngleton
resulted in a different treatment by the Court of the third party standing ques-
tion." However, the Court failed to take the same approach as it did in
Singleton when faced with analogous facts in Simen v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organization." In that case a welfare rights organization claimed injury
to its members by their inability to obtain emergency treatment in tax-exempt
"charitable" hospitals. The Court held that the organizational and individual
plaintiffs had failed to allege injury in fact and dismissed for lack of standing.
This conclusion seems inconsistent with the decision in Singleton. Inability to
receive adequate hospital care clearly interferes with an individual's interest in
preserving his good health. If this interest is not protected, his right to pursue
employment and a normal family life48 is as greatly jeopardized as would be an
indigent woman's privacy rights by a statute denying her Medicaid payments for
an abortion. Since in both Singleton and Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion the interests at stake seem equally fundamental, the cases cannot be dis-
45 96 S. Ct. 2868.
46 The dissent in Singleton particularly noted this lack of a bar to the third-party's own
assertion of his rights and questioned whether "cautious reserve" might not indicate the use
of the judicial self-restraint rule to deny this action. Justice Powell particularly feared that
the holding in Singleton could provide authority for any provider of services to attack a
welfare statute for exempting his particular transaction. However, given the Court's usual focus
on the sensitive nature of the rights involved in an acti6n, this result seems unlikely. See
accompanying text supra at note 38.
47 96 S. Ct. 1917.
48 These interests have been included by the Court, for example, within the scope of the
fourteenth amendment protection of individual liberty. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972).
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tinguished on substantive grounds. Hence, it appears that the Court applied a
looser .standard in Singleton for reasons of policy rather than substance.
Although justification of the Court's more lenient approach to standing in
Singleton may be in part a necessary concession to the volatile nature of the
abortion issue involved, its decision reveals the possible arbitrariness inherent in
undue court formulation of social policy. Whether to provide government funds
for abortions involves a legislative choice among numerous political and social
views. Any decision thus reached is ultimately subject to approval or rejection
by the electorate. This type of basic policy decision clearly belongs to a legislature
constitutionally empowered to appropriate funds to implement the chosen policy.
Court involvement in this process constitutes an encroachment upon a co-equal
governmental branch.
IV. Standing: Present and Future
Although the present state of the standing doctrine is somewhat confused,
its future development will predictably continue to reflect the Court's growing
dissatisfaction with its role as arbiter of public policy. Of course, public plaintiffs
will continue to be granted standing. However, as recent opinions indicate, the
present Court will more strictly scrutinize the allegations of each plaintiff to
determine if he has alleged sufficient personal injury to sharpen the issues into
concrete adverseness.
Nevertheless, it appears that the lower courts, influenced perhaps by the
philosophies of their own members, will apply the Supreme Court's various
standing tests erratically. Often a lower court will jointly invoke the Flast
"nexus" test, Data Processors "zone of interests" test, and the Warth "actual
injury to plaintiff's interests" test despite the Supreme Court's de-emphasis of the
former two tests in Warth.49 Despite these variations, the primary emphasis in
standing decisions will remain on the "injury in fact" test, which in certain
decisions has been applied with a strictness resembling the "direct injury" test of
Frothingham.0
After Warth, some uncertainty nevertheless persists concerning the type and
extent of allegations needed to satisfy the actual injury test. The Court recently
clarified how concrete an injury the plaintiff must demonstrate. In Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,1 upon facts remarkably
similar to those of Warth, the Court ruled that the respondent, Metro Housing,
had standing. Unlike the organizational plaintiff in Warth where no such show-
ing was made, Metro Housing alleged that its planned housing project was can-
celled by the village's refusal to rezone a single-family dwelling area. The specific
nature of the injury alleged established to the Court's satisfaction the existence of
an actual harm which could be redressed by a favorable decision.
The Court's treatment of the standing issue with respect to the organiza-
tional plaintiff in Arlington is not surprising. The Court in Warth v. Seldin had
49 See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976); Evans v. Lynn, 537 U.S. 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
50 See, 96 S. Ct. 1917.
51 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
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"left open the federal court doors to plaintiffs who have some interest in a
particular housing project and who, but for the restrictive zoning ordinances
would be able to reside in the community."52 In Arlington, allegations were
made showing the specific effect of the zoning ordinance on the project. The
Court's opinion strongly supports the conclusion that a clearly stated allegation
of personal injury by thE plaintiff can be dispositive of the standing issue. As
Arlington indicates, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the particular personal
injury will be redressed by the favorable outcome of the suit, the Court will be
satisfied that the standing tests have been met. Accordingly, the existence of a
case or controversy, clearly, will have been demonstrated. This will prevent any
"gratuitous" and, thus, unconstitutional exercise of federal judicial power in con-
sidering the issues raised.
Nonetheless, a plaintiff who is able to allege a concrete injury must still
overcome concern caused by increasing judicial forays into public policy. Courts
may feel that other compelling reasons exist for refusing the case, despite the
plaintiff's alleged actual injury. To justify such a refusal, there is some indication
that the zone of interests test may be revived to deny or grant standing.53 A
narrow or broad delineation of the protected zone of interests may depend on
the court's opinion of the wisdom of hearing a case.
In light of the present status of the standing doctrine, future developments
in standing guidelines will probably reflect the judiciary's fears of its own increas-
ing power to decide which of many competing social interests are more valuable
and worthy of protection. Standing decisions are articulating this uneasiness,
and adopting a basically cautious approach to standing questions. This caution
becomes especially important "when the relief sought would be impractical in
effect; bring about conflict with two coordinate branches; and, cause the judiciary
to provide government by injunction."'54
Particularly in jus tertii actions, plaintiffs will be required to carefully allege
a concrete injury to themselves. Furthermore, if the interest so injured does not
fall within the boundaries of the zone of interests drawn by judicial caution, the
plaintiff's action will be dismissed for lack of standing. Despite this cautious
attitude, anomalies in standing decisions probably will continue when standing
issues are presented in cases in which the sensitive nature of the right itself dic-
tates a more liberal approach.
V. Conclusion
Standing has functioned in the past as an effective bar to judicial con-
sideration of certain issues. It is doubtful that a more rigid application of
mechanical rules of standing will have the practical effect of reducing the fed-
eral courts' work load by discouraging potential plaintiffs. Certainly, in the
short run, there will be no discernible effect. In the long run, the courts' attitude
may simply encourage most plaintiffs raising constitutional or other rights to
make more careful allegations of personal injury to meet the threshold case-or-
52 522 F.2d at 902.
53 96 S. Ct. 1917.
54 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
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controversy requirement. More careful framing of the issues may reassure a
court wary of too much intervention to consider more social policy questions in
the context of a specifically pleaded, properly adversarial case.
Generally speaking, there is no indication that standing will be simplified
to any great extent. Its current complexity is actually a reflection of the negative
attitudes of the Court's members towards judicial activism in social policy.
Without such limitations . . . essentially matters of judicial self-goverance
-the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide
public significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions. 55
Standing will continue to fulfill one of its major functions as a catchall doctrine
used by the Court, in the exercise of its rule of self-restraint, when it feels that
the consideration of a certain issue would push the bounds of judicial review to
intolerable limits.
Mary E. Schaffner
55 422 U.S. at 500.
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